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 “Sovereignty is about a claimed status but not about the problems these claims 
raise” 
(Werner and de Wilde 2001, 296) 
 
1. Introduction: EU Democracy and the Tension between Federalism and 
Confederalism 
 
It is commonly assumed that sovereignty is indivisible and hence that in any 
polity there has to be an institution able to claim ultimate political authority. By 
implication, indivisibility also means that confederation (a union of states) and 
federation (one state with more or less autonomous units) are mutually exclusive 
categories: “there can be nothing in between” (Onuf 1991, 432). Nevertheless, 
the EU seems to be precisely the “in between order” (Wind 2001, 103; cf. 
Sørensen 1999) that undermines such peremptory statements about the nature 
of sovereignty. The complicated story of sovereignty within the EU is 
accompanied by an equally unusual and problematic system of democratic 
accountability. Whereas other chapters in this volume emphasize the way states 
play games with sovereignty for manifold ends, this contribution examines the 
manner in which EU member states’ sovereignty claims constitute playing a 
game with democracy itself. Whilst EU democracy has often been seen as 
etiolated, this chapter argues that – unlike many democratizing proposals that 
seek to overcome or bury member state sovereignty claims – such claims should 
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in fact be understood as an essential feature of the complex art of negotiating the 
relationship between integration and EU democracy.  
 
It is important, for the purposes of the argument, to recognize that there is a 
fundamental tension between federal and confederal principles of organizing 
political authority (Hamilton et al. 2003). In a pure confederation, the unit of 
political representation is solely a collective one (a people, a state) and legal acts 
fall on states in their “corporate or collective capacities” (ibid. 67). Thus a 
confederal political order is “a contractual union of states” (Forsyth 1981, 3). 
Conversely, in a federal order, individuals are represented alongside territorial 
units for the purposes of decision-making and legislation touches citizens directly 
(Hamilton et al. 2003). The representation of individuals thus circumscribes the 
autonomy of constituent units – it may also potentially alter their sovereign 
equality by giving more influence to the most populous units. The existence of 
federally-guaranteed individual rights constitutes another major potential 
restriction on the sovereign capacities of units within a federal system. The EU’s 
hybrid system of federalism and confederalism is thus characterized by the 
creation of an autonomous, constitutionalized legal order consisting of individual 
rights (Weiler 1999) alongside a political order where major decisions are taken 
by member states, often as (supposedly) equal participants. 
 
This chapter rests on the supposition that the antagonism between these two, 
federal and confederal, principles is at the heart of the sovereignty game of 
integration and has important consequences for the functioning of democracy in 
Europe. The intention is less to make a point about the nature of sovereignty 
than to demonstrate the use to which sovereignty is put in the process of 
integration and to consider the consequences this has for democratic theory and 
practice. Interpreting the balance of confederalism and federalism as a 
sovereignty game, the argument traces the evolution of this central integrationist 
tension to show that the amalgamation of both principles is a very taxing game. 
This game is both ideological (based on national or supranational attachment) 
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and rational (actors’ preferences often depend on perceived interests). However, 
given that sovereignty is a claimed status that is most asserted precisely when 
that status is challenged (Werner and de Wilde 2001),1 this chapter focuses in 
particular on the moments when member states have used sovereignty claims 
either to try to limit the supranational character of integration or to establish 
special rights for certain states.  
 
The sovereignty game of integration has a profound impact on democracy since 
changes to a state’s claimed status of sovereignty invariably affect democratic 
processes (Bartolini 2005; Bickerton et al. 2006). This is because state 
sovereignty and popular sovereignty in the democratic era are mutually 
constitutive and cannot be easily disentangled (Walker 2007). Thus, the mixture 
of confederalism and federalism in the EU system is the key to understanding the 
democracy game of European integration.  
 
The purpose of this contribution is threefold, as reflected in the tripartite division 
of the chapter. The first objective is to describe and explain the sovereignty game 
of integration by reference to how sovereignty claims have produced the unusual 
mixture of federal and confederal principles of representation. The second goal is 
to show that this sovereignty game is also a democracy game and analyze 
accordingly the problematic consequences this second game has had on the 
member states and the EU alike. The third and final ambition is to explore how 
adequately various proposals regarding how to respond to these changes in the 
nature and practice of democracy deal with the problem of sovereignty claims.  
 
2. Assertions of Sovereignty and the Combination of Confederalism and 
Federalism in the Sovereignty Game of Integration 
 
European integration’s impact on the Westphalian notion of the state is often 
understood in dichotomous terms (Jackson 1999). For some, the EU is no threat 
to state sovereignty (Moravcsik 1993; Keohane 2002); others regard the EU as 
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the symbol of a fundamentally changed, post-sovereign order (MacCormick 
1999; Weiler 1999; Bellamy 2003). Typically, this polarized debate has recourse 
to some form of quantification of the extent to which sovereignty has been pooled 
(Donahue and Pollack 2001; McKay 2001) and tracing the motives for this 
common undertaking (Moravcsik 1998). However, such a debate does not 
necessarily tell us much about sovereignty since the arguments largely revolve 
around questions of substantial statehood as a capacity for certain actions 
(Sørensen 1999) rather than sovereignty as a claimed status. An alternative 
conceptual framework has tried to bypass these antinomies by using the notion 
of “interdependence sovereignty” (Krasner 1999) to explain the somewhat 
perplexing situation whereby states are losing individual control over certain 
transnational interactions whilst gaining a collective capacity to deal with them. 
Yet Jackson (1999) maintains that conceptualizing sovereignty as a resource that 
can be transferred, as Keohane (2002) does for instance, is a solecism.2  
 
The intention here is to side-step these controversies about the era of 
sovereignty in which we live. Instead, this section focuses on identifying 
assertions of sovereignty by member states as responses to the process of 
integration. These assertions are understood as essential to the maintenance of 
confederal principles within the hybrid system of political representation 
described above. The argument thus conceptualizes sovereignty not as a set of 
rights – easily identifiable, like the fasces carried by the Roman lictors – but as a 
claimed status which is then used “to legitimize certain rights, duties and 
competences” (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 297). Hence the analysis presents 
sovereignty claims as crucial instruments in constituting the EU political system.  
 
As befits a complex concept like sovereignty, these assertions take various 
forms. However, not included within this category are instances of attempted 
legal resistance to EU supremacy (Goldstein 2001) or simple non-compliance 
(Falkner et al. 2004), because neither is part of the formal sovereignty game of 
delimiting the scope of the integration process and defining the status of member 
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state sovereignty within this process. Rather, the term assertion refers here to 
those actions that either serve to establish a special status or rights for a certain 
state (or several) or else those that try to set boundaries to the scope of 
supranationalism, thereby protecting the sovereignty claims of all. Amongst the 
latter figure the remaining unanimity requirement in certain policy areas, the 
creation, in foreign policy as well as judicial and police co-operation, of a 
separate decision-making system with a separate legal basis attenuating the 
supervisory power of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the treaty-based 
prohibition of legal harmonization in certain policy areas. As regards the former 
type of sovereignty assertion, the measures include treaty protocols, opt-outs 
and national referendums on EU matters, although this is not an exhaustive list. 
What follows is a brief description of these two types of sovereignty assertion and 
an explanation of how they have produced a dual system of political 
representation.  
 
Sovereignty Assertions as Barriers to Supranationalism 
 
As a hybrid polity the EU walks a tightrope between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. From the outset, integration entrenched the “community 
method,” incorporating the supranational principle, rather than the historically 
plausible alternative of a purely confederal institutional model (Parsons 2003). In 
fact, the first manifestation of a sovereignty assertion within the integration 
framework was an assault on the supranational principle itself: the “empty chair 
crisis” of 1965-6. Although de Gaulle’s diplomatic struggle took the form of an 
institutional conflict – France’s refusal to participate in meetings of the Council of 
Ministers, the senior legislative body representing states’ interests – it was 
largely a debate over norms and expectations as de Gaulle refused to accept 
European Economic Community (EEC) competency except through unanimity. 
 
Having briefly toyed with renegotiating the EEC Treaty, de Gaulle eventually 
“committed to the Community track but refused new progress along it” (ibid. 126) 
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by forcing the “Luxembourg Compromise” upon the other member states. Hence 
the solution was not to re-design institutions but to establish a new norm: “when 
very important issues are at stake, discussions must be continued until 
unanimous agreement is reached.” Thus what was secured was not the 
sovereign status or prerogatives of a particular member state; unanimity 
preserves the formal equal status of all. Although informal, the Luxembourg 
compromise had long-lasting effects on integration (Garrett 1995). Yet 
supranationalism did not fall by the wayside. Subsequent battles between 
unanimity and qualified majority voting, however, gave rise to more formal 
attempts to use the confederal principle to limit the reach of supranationalism. 
 
Several attempts to counterbalance the deepening of integration with a renewed 
commitment to intergovernmentalism are worthy of mention here. The first 
concerns the remnants of the Luxembourg compromise in what is now termed 
the first policy “pillar.” In this pillar, where qualified majority voting (QMV) has 
become the norm, treaty reform, the accession of new member states and 
taxation remain subject to unanimous decision-making (Magnette 2005). The 
veto on treaty amendment, in particular, ensures that the EU appears a strictly 
voluntary association of sovereign states for the pursuit of mutual advantage 
(Boucher 2005, 103). Unanimous treaty amendment – in effect the process by 
which the units may alter the purposes for which they associate (ibid.) – is fully in 
keeping with international law. Under Article 40.4 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (1969), states cannot be forced to become parties to 
amended multilateral treaties to which they have not consented (Witte 2004b).  
 
The confederal character of such an arrangement is pellucid. The EU treaty 
amendment procedure establishes a unity constituted by all states as equals – it 
is “a contract between equals to act henceforth as one” (Forysth 1981, 16) – 
rather than the federal alternative of a unity formed from a majority of citizens 
and/or a qualified majority of states (Trechsel 2005; Auer 2007). In this way, first 
pillar vetoes are part of the reason why member states can still successfully 
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claim sovereign status and “enjoy the rights and powers related to that status” 
(Werner and de Wilde 2001, 304). Moreover, the unanimity requirement for 
admitting new members, which accords with the definition of sovereignty as the 
exclusive “ability to make authoritative political decisions” (Thompson 1995, 216), 
further underlines the equality of states. The corollary of having the authority to 
determine membership expansion is the member states’ prerogative to determine 
their continued adherence to the EU. The EU Lisbon Treaty now outlines the 
terms for voluntary withdrawal (Article 35), which for some is definitive proof of 
member states’ retention of sovereignty (Sørensen 1999; Boucher 2005).3 
Whatever the precise implication for state sovereignty, the right of withdrawal 
certainly means that there cannot be the same agonizing over whether the EU is 
a perpetual union as there was in the antebellum US (Stampp 1978). In the pro- 
and anti-integration cleavage, this unambiguous confederal element – even if no 
mainstream party in Europe advocates quitting the union – thus serves to 
reassure the constituency of voters attached to the shibboleth of sovereignty.  
 
The hybrid nature of representation was further complicated by the creation of 
the so-called second and third policy “pillars” at Maastricht, which added a new 
confederal element. Unanimous decision-making in these sensitive policy areas, 
foreign policy and judicial and police co-operation respectively, was obviously in 
large part motivated by member states’ understanding of sovereignty as both 
authority and control (Thompson 1995). However, the member states were not 
simply protecting their competences, they were also defending the right of states 
to represent their citizens. Thus what is especially interesting about this 
sovereignty game is the way in which both these intergovernmental pillars were 
insulated, to varying degrees, from the institutions of supranational 
representation, namely the Commission, the European Parliament and the ECJ 
(Börzel 2005). In particular, by restricting the jurisdiction of the ECJ over these 
policy areas, the states ensured that legal acts bind states in their corporate or 
collective capacities and do not create rights for individuals. Even though the 
Lisbon Treaty abolishes the pillar system, the circumscription of ECJ jurisdiction 
 8 
is maintained. A precedent for such a move can be found in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, where elements of the former Justice and Home Affairs pillar were 
integrated into the first pillar although the procedures for legislating in this area 
did not follow orthodox community law (Hanf 2001). The insistence on unanimity, 
member state co-power of initiative and reduced ECJ jurisdiction, has resulted in 
what has been described as the creation of a new hybrid, “intergovernmentalised 
EC law” (ibid. 17). Indeed, this move has given rise to a new inter-institutional 
sovereignty game as the Commission and Council of Ministers clash over which 
legal regime relevant legislation should fall under.4  
 
There were other attempts at Maastricht to delimit the potential expansion of 
supranationalism. One such was the introduction of the subsidiarity principle, 
which defined efficiency as the deciding principle for the level at which power will 
be exercised so that the EU can legislate “if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community” (Article 3b). This was supposed to “enhance further 
the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions” (Preamble) by 
ensuring that political decisions “are taken as closely as possible to the citizen” 
(Preamble). Subsidiarity was pushed by the most adamantine champion of 
sovereignty, the UK, in order to establish that “member states are not prepared to 
accept an unlimited extension of Community competences” (Dehousse 1994, 
125).  
 
However, the subsidiarity principle has not established the boundaries of national 
and European competences respectively. This is because it employs the criterion 
of effectiveness for defining the applicable level of government action. This 
means that the ECJ is not called upon to rule on Kompetenz-Kompetenz directly, 
rather the court is to rule “on the compared efficiency of both [national and 
European] types of measure” (ibid. 110). Even at the time of introduction a 
leading EU lawyer declared that it would prove a stillborn clause (ibid.: 124) and 
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time has proved this claim correct as the ECJ has only made two explicit 
subsidiarity rulings (Magnette 2005, 54). The initial failure of subsidiarity 
illustrates the difficulty of specifying exactly how sovereignty claims fit into the EU 
system. Yet the desire to allow states to use sovereignty claims to establish the 
division of competences continues. Hence the new role for national parliaments 
envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, including both the “early warning” procedure 
(Protocol 2, Article 7) that forces a legislative draft to be reviewed if a third of 
national parliaments declare it to violate the subsidiarity principle and the 
attribution of veto power over unanimous Council of Ministers decisions to move 
to QMV in certain policy areas. Moreover a further declaration on the delimitation 
of competences for the first time specifies that in revising the treaties member 
states can choose to “reduce the competences conferred on the Union.”  
 
The second method of limiting the transfer of competences for the foreseeable 
future was the introduction into the amended treaty of Rome of specific clauses 
prohibiting harmonization in certain policy areas. In the fields of education (Article 
126), vocational training (127), culture (128) and public health (129) [now 149-
152 EC] the European Union was only permitted to “adopt incentive measures, 
excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.” 
Moreover, the tension between diversity and uniformity has also given rise to the 
development of “flexibility” within the single market framework by adopting the 
principle of minimum standard harmonization (Barnard 2000). Minimal standards 
do not, in areas like consumer protection (Article 153 (5) EC) or public health 
(Article 152 (4a) EC), prevent member states imposing higher national standards 
provided they meet certain justifiable conditions (Hanf 2001).  
 
Sovereignty assertions as barriers to supranationalism, therefore, have played a 
key role in the construction of the political constitution of Europe. This 
sovereignty game has been played in order to limit the supranational ambitions of 
the European project by devising rules and procedures that protect the 
sovereignty claims of all states. However, there is another category of 
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sovereignty assertion that needs to be explored: when individual states affirm 
their right to a special status thereby creating rules of their own making.  
 
Sovereignty Assertions as a State’s Right to a Special Status 
 
This second type of sovereignty claim is perhaps most visible in various treaty 
protocols that mention the specific treatment reserved for certain states.5 For 
instance, both Ireland (Protocol 17, Maastricht Treaty) and Malta (Protocol 7, 
Accession Treaty) are guaranteed the autonomy to legislate on abortion, 
although the EU has never tried to do so and lacks the necessary competences. 
However, protocols need not be merely symbolic statements destined to 
reassure states and their citizens about what the EU cannot do. Since entry into 
the EEC in 1972, Denmark has restricted non-residents’ right to buy second 
homes, especially in coastal areas. Its right to do so is a protocol privilege that 
goes directly against the single market’s principle of free movement of capital. 
Other countries, with the exception of Malta, have not been permitted to restrict 
home ownership in this fashion.  
 
The 2004 candidate countries – even though in areas with large pre-war German 
populations foreign home ownership was controversial – were allowed to place 
merely transitional restrictions on EU nationals’ ownership of real estate (Mihaljek 
2005). Only tiny Malta was granted a permanent derogation, as already 
mentioned. Thus, when viewed from the perspective of sovereignty as “meta-
political authority” (Thompson 1995, 214), the Danish state has kept its ability to 
treat foreign home ownership as a domestic political issue. Even though property 
speculation based on capital inflows can have a serious impact on housing 
affordability for the local population, potentially causing other socio-economic 
problems, EU member states (with the two exceptions mentioned above) have 
effectively agreed to depoliticize this issue since they no longer individually wield 
authority in this area. 
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Akin to the above protocol guarantees are policy opt-outs. The latter are ex ante 
treaty agreements allowing member states not to participate in a new community 
policy. Opt-outs are a practical tool for enabling the inclusion of new political 
objectives within the treaty framework despite the opposition of certain states 
(Hanf 2001). Recalcitrant member states agree not to block treaty reform on 
condition that they will not be bound by these new arrangements. The first opt-
outs were brokered at Maastricht. The UK opted out of the third stage of 
economic and monetary union, the single currency, as well as spurning the 
Protocol on Social Policy (Raepenbusch and Hank 2001).6 Denmark similarly 
refused to convert to the euro and also turned its back on defense co-operation 
in the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy (Hansen 2002).7 Later 
rounds of treaty amendment continued the opt-out trend favored by these same 
protagonists. The UK and Ireland (bundled together because of their Common 
Travel Area) opted out of the communitarization of visas, asylum and immigration 
(Shaw 1998). Denmark did likewise but its opt-out is legally and practically 
different since, unlike the UK and Ireland, the country is part of the Schengen 
free travel area (ibid.; Adler-Nissen, this volume). 
 
The opt-outs on the single currency were initially considered to be merely 
temporary derogations. However, more than a decade later, Denmark and the 
UK still remain beyond the euro pale whilst Sweden, not a member at the time of 
Maastricht, unilaterally refused to join (Lindahl and Naurin 2005). As concessions 
to confederalism, these assertions of sovereignty are practically, but above all 
symbolically, significant. In particular, they reveal certain countries’ ability to 
define a special status for themselves within the EU. Arguably, certain non-
members have likewise negotiated their relationship with the EU on the basis of 
identity-based sovereignty claims that privilege the symbolic value of staying 
outside the fold above having a say in a process of integration into which they 
are inexorably drawn. Thus non-membership is nevertheless compatible with 
participation in Schengen (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), the adoption of 
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single market legislation (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) and even financial 
solidarity (Switzerland awarded one billion francs to the 2004 accession states).  
 
Intimately bound up with the euro opt-outs – as well as the ultimate opt-out of 
refusing membership, as occurred in the Norwegian and Swiss cases – is the 
phenomenon of the national referendum, which should be understood as an 
assertion of sovereignty. Whereas the other sovereignty assertions described 
here have been exercised by governments, acting in the name of a state, 
referendums are expressions of popular sovereignty even if they are often called 
at the discretion of the government of the day.8 Referendums have been held on 
enlargement, accession, continued membership, treaty reform and the euro. 
Since this form of ratification is not prescribed by the EU, referendums in 
principle embody the autonomy of member states in choosing how to deal with 
the political challenge of integration. However, a government’s decision to call a 
referendum can also be influenced by domestic political considerations far-
removed from EU constitutional politics, which makes them unpredictable and 
hard to handle. Regardless of this dark side of referendums, their increasing use 
has made it much more difficult for governments to reject out of hand this mode 
of ratification for treaty revision. This can be seen both from the repeated calls in 
several member states for the Lisbon Treaty to be put to a popular vote and the 
care with which certain constitutional elements (the name itself but also the EU 
anthem and hymn) were jettisoned to allow governments to tell their citizens that 
these revisions were not substantive enough to warrant a referendum.  
 
Paradoxically, although direct democracy at the national level symbolizes the 
confederal principle of collective representation, referendums can run counter to 
the other confederal principle of state equality. This is because votes in one 
member state may have important ramifications on others. Such a state of affairs 
is exactly what occurred in the aftermath of the French and Dutch popular 
rejections of the draft EU Constitution in 2005. Member states that ratified the EU 
Constitution – the outcome of a strictly confederal, that is, unanimous and equal, 
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process – were prevented from putting into operation this new treaty as a result 
of popular sovereignty in two member states. This tension is set to increase in 
the future as the French constitution has been changed to ensure that there is an 
automatic referendum on any future enlargement (Article 88.5).9 Thus France will 
have a special – hence unequal – right to decide the fate of membership 
applications twice, firstly through government representation and secondly by the 
people directly.  
 
The fact that national referendums on treaties have implications stretching 
beyond the borders of the member state in question has been used to argue that 
it is simply irresponsible to subject the constitutional future of the EU to national 
votes (Auer 2007). However, to deny states this authority would amount to a 
serious restriction of the confederal principle of representation as the only 
alternative is some kind of Europe-wide referendum based either on a majority of 
individuals or a double majority of states and citizens as happens in Switzerland. 
Furthermore, the critique of national referendums is also a denial of the national 
political community as a pouvoir constituant capable of changing the very form of 
government of a state (Yack 2001). It is precisely in this constituent capacity that 
the people redeem their right to self-government – implying that they are 
responsible to no third party – thereby constituting the basis for state legitimation 
in the modern era (Hont 1994). This explains why the federal alternative, a pan-
European popular sovereignty, is so attractive. The formula sounds perfect: 
supranational legitimacy for a supranational project. Yet as the above discussion 
has shown, states have used sovereignty claims precisely to limit the 
supranational scope of the project and to ground – often on the basis of popular 
pressure – its legitimacy on confederal representation.  
 
As revealed in the analysis above, the sovereignty game is something far more 
complex than a zero-sum game where sovereignty is imagined to be an 
indivisible capacity that is necessarily transferred from one institutional actor to 
another. If anything, the evolution of member states’ claim to sovereign status as 
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a result of integration has made their assertion of this claim more rather than less 
relevant to EU politics. Consequently, EU politics is now confronted with a 
“sovereignty surplus,” characterized by multiple and overlapping sovereignty 
claims (Walker 2007). Yet it remains to be seen what the impact of the 
sovereignty game – the result of compounding systems of political representation 
– has had on democracy. This is a particularly pressing question given that 
democracy is traditionally associated with an ultimately exclusive model of 
sovereignty (ibid.).  
 
Hence the next section of the chapter is devoted to understanding how exactly 
the EU hybrid polity’s reworking of sovereignty challenges the concept and 
practice of democracy in Europe. Diagnoses of and remedies for the 
contemporary ailments of democracy caused by the sovereignty game of 
integration differ markedly but they seldom make reference to the principles of 
political representation structuring the EU polity. The fourth and final section 
reviews these assessments of and proposals for dealing with the consequences 
of integration from the perspective of how they address the problem of 
sovereignty claims. In this way, the ambition is to offer a new angle for 
interpreting the appropriateness of proposals for coming to terms with the effects 
of integration on democracy.  
 
3. Sovereignty Games and Democracy in the EU 
 
Federal, confederal and compound forms of representation have long been 
thought to affect the nature of democracy (Hamilton et al. 2003). After all, the 
point of the American federal experiment was to make popular sovereignty 
compatible with liberty (Tocqueville 1994). In reality, the relationship also works 
the other way round as Carl Schmitt argued that “the federal foundation and 
federalism itself are destroyed by the democratic concept of the constituent 
power of the whole people” (1992, 55). According to Schmitt, the democratization 
of the US in the nineteenth century resulted in “a federal state without a federal 
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foundation” (ibid.). Similarly, cultural factors are also part of the representation 
and democracy equation.10 It has been shown, for instance, that in federal 
Austria and Germany a common linguistic and cultural community results in a 
nation-wide demos that discusses politics from a centralized rather than 
fragmented perspective (Erk 2003, 2004). However, given the dual nature of the 
EU as both a commonwealth in itself and a union of commonwealths, the impact 
of the above sovereignty games is Janus-like, affecting both EU democracy and 
member-state democracy. Hence the strategic relationship between sovereignty, 
integration and democracy will be examined from this dual perspective, albeit 
briefly since this section is intended as a prelude to a discussion of the reform 
proposals that have arisen from the changed context of European democracy. 
 
Sovereignty Games and EU Democracy 
 
A common complaint regarding the EU polity is its complexity, aptly illustrated by 
the up to thirty different steps of the current codecision procedure. In fact, the 
problem of complexity is the defining characteristic of pluralist democracies when 
compared with parliamentary models of democracy (Coultrap 1999). EU 
pluralism is precisely the result of adopting the dual system of representation as 
an alternative to an uncomplicated supranational majoritarian system that would 
ride roughshod over state sovereignty claims. The result is a vertical and 
horizontal separation of powers that promotes consensus through mutual checks 
and balances as well as continual institutional dialogue. This plural regime, 
however, is distinctly out of kilter with many citizens’ notions of politics based on 
the operation of parliamentary democracy (Schmidt 2004). In fact, the alien 
nature of the EU’s consensus-based model of democracy has been used as a 
justification for shielding it from referendum votes in which citizens cannot 
appreciate properly the merits of the system (Dehousse 2006; Moravcsik 2006).  
 
Regardless of the more subjective issue of whether the EU system is beyond the 
ken of most ordinary citizens, political scientists have identified a host of other 
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problems resulting from Europe’s peculiar dual representation that vexes 
democracy. Notable amongst these is the lack of transparent decision-making 
arising from the closed meetings of the Council of Ministers – secrecy being the 
cloak behind which diplomatic maneuverings between states try to reach 
consensus positions (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 342). In addition, the 
low salience of many problems of regulatory policy within the compass of EU 
authority in tandem with the opaqueness and technocratic element of decision-
making favors the access of corporate interest groups to the detriment of civil 
society (Streeck and Schmitter 1991).  
 
Moreover, the treaty bargains struck over the size of each member state’s cohort 
of representatives in the European Parliament have produced a serious 
imbalance of representation, with the small countries well over-represented in 
terms of citizens per Member of the European Parliament (MEP) (Rodden 2002). 
Of course, federal systems almost universally contain some form of unequal 
representation to prevent simple majoritarianism (Dahl 2001, 47). However, the 
peculiarity of the EU is that, besides the evident anti-majoritarian devices of 
unanimity and QMV in the Council of Ministers, the institution supposed to 
embody the principle of popular sovereignty, the European Parliament, is also 
seriously malapportioned. Owing precisely to the need to respect the status of 
member states, small countries have obtained a highly generous over-
representation of MEPs per capita – so much so that the EU’s directly elected 
legislature is the world’s second most malapportioned lower house (Rodden 
2002, 155).  
 
Yet the most important democratic consequence of the sovereignty game of 
integration for the EU has been the hollowness of European public participation, 
debate and accountability (Schmidt 2004). The abstruse, consensus-building 
model of politics dominated by national executives rather than European political 
parties has combined with a variety of other factors, including public indifference, 
to hamper electoral contestation of leadership and policy (Follesdal and Hix 
 17 
2005). The low salience of the business of the European Parliament  is not 
surprising given that the member states have tried to prevent this supranational 
body from diminishing the importance of the confederal principle of 
representation. This effort has also drawn succor from national parties’ 
disinclination to politicize the integration cleavage within the domestic arena 
(Mair 2005), a cleavage which is in any case not isomorphic with the traditional 
left/right dimension of European politics (Bartolini 2005). The net result, 
therefore, is a polity that, unlike European nation-states, is not based on 
government by the people through active popular participation nor does is follow 
the logic of a government of the people courtesy of elected representatives and 
neither is it really government for the people because its effectiveness is easy to 
call into question (Schmidt 2004, 977). 
 
Sovereignty Games and Democracy in the Member States 
 
Since the impact of the sovereignty game of integration on democracy in the 
EU’s member states is an equally familiar part of the EU studies literature only a 
brief exposition is necessary. Domestic politics has been adversely affected by 
more than simply the growth of supranationalism, which challenges claims to 
domestic autonomy. The way in which the sovereignty game of integration is 
played – national governments are key actors in this process – has also proved 
significant, with the need to maintain a complex hybrid polity a large factor in the 
problems this has posed for democracy.  
 
Firstly, there has been the augmentation in the discretionary power of national 
executives as a result of their participation in transnational governance structures 
that are more isolated from the gaze of national parliamentary scrutiny (Anderson 
and Burns, 1996; Raunio 1999). Secondly, the creation of a new institutional 
level for policy-making has also allowed executives to “venue shop” in order to 
find a more favorable arena for implementing their preferences (Guiraudon 
2000). Venue shopping, alongside the secrecy of the Council of Ministers, also 
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profits governments by facilitating the blame avoidance potential that exists 
where there is a two-level game of international bargaining (Vaubel 1994; Rotte 
1998). Both these changes in national democratic practices, therefore, relate to 
the powers member states derive from the confederal element of the EU.  
 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the sovereignty game has profoundly 
affected democracy by altering member states’ ability to define the political, what 
Thompson (1995) calls “meta-political authority.” As described above, integration 
has in many policy areas diminished states’ capacity to define an issue as a 
political problem requiring a domestic solution. This is a recurrent trend in 
everyday EU politics. It is well illustrated by the recent conflict between the 
Commission and Austria as a result of the latter’s attempt to restrict the number 
of German students studying in its medical and dental faculties because Austria 
does not use a numerus clausus entry system. In this example, following a 2005 
ECJ ruling,11 (a similar problem has arisen in Belgium following an influx of 
French students), the Austrian government stands accused of breaching the 
principle of free movement of students, meaning that it is unable to define – and 
thus settle – a question of education policy as a domestic affair (Anderson and 
Glencross 2007).  
 
Moreover, since member states are locked in to the sovereignty game it appears 
impossible for them to redefine an issue as one of domestic politics, even in the 
case of policy failure. Thus despite the dubious record of the Common Fisheries 
Policy in terms of stock conservation (Payne 2000), member states cannot try to 
remedy this failure on their own by opting out ex post, as shown by the 
Factortame case (MacCormick 1999). Hence national governments’ ability to 
respond to policy problems or public concerns is now far more constrained than 
according to the simple domestic model of lex posterior derogat legi priori.  
 
Since these changes in national democracy have also coincided with the 
democratic woes of the EU system as a whole, the net result has been the 
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“depoliticization” of European public life (Mair 2005, 2007; Schmidt 2006). 
Indeed, it appears that the thinness of EU democratic life has had a deleterious 
effect on national politics (Mair 2007, 8). Besides the circumscription of states’ 
meta-political authority and their ability to respond to their citizens’ concerns, the 
European project has seen the growing use of non-majoritarian institutions “from 
which politics and parties are deliberately excluded” (Mair 2005, 12). Given this 
reconfiguration of European democracy it is no surprise that manifold proposals 
have been put forward in order to come to terms with the impact of the 
sovereignty game on democracy. In particular, given that the causality behind 
this relationship seems to stem from the EU level downwards, the mooted 
reforms invariably have as their starting point EU democracy. The following 
section analyses the arguments that dominate this debate by looking at whether 
their attempts to respond to the democracy game take account of how the 
sovereignty game has reconfigured democracy.  
 
4. Reconciling Integration with Democracy: The Problematic Role of 
Sovereignty Claims 
 
Participants in the debate about how to reconcile European integration with 
democracy can be separated into two main camps. Whereas some propose a 
more or less radical restructuring of the EU in order to breathe new democratic 
life into its institutions, others believe it is more germane to use this opportunity to 
reconsider the nature of contemporary democratic practices. It would be 
histrionic to say that there is an enormous gulf between these two visions of the 
state of democracy in Europe. Nevertheless, there is a clear line of separation 
demarcating those who fret not about the health of EU democracy, like Coultrap 
(1999), Moravcsik (2006) and Majone (2006) and those who recommend 
immediate action to improve its democratic legitimacy (Schmitter 2000; Hix 
2007). However, upon closer scrutiny, both these perspectives seem problematic 
when it comes to appreciating the crucial role of sovereignty claims in the 
construction of the EU. Changing the democracy game of the EU polity will 
 20 
significantly affect the sovereignty game – just as the latter has reconfigured the 
former. Hence proposals for reforming the EU in the name of democracy, if they 
are to be convincing, have to take seriously the sovereignty game. In particular, if 
the intention is to find an alternative to sovereignty claims because they have 
proved problematic for democracy, these proposals have to give a convincing 
account of what will replace or abolish the instrumental use of sovereignty 
claims. 
 
Democratizing the EU: Overcoming Sovereignty Claims through 
Supranationalism? 
 
Democratizing the EU is synonymous with increasing the importance of 
supranational representation at the expense of confederalism. Hence the usual 
suggestions are threefold: beef up the powers of the EP (Andersen and Burns 
1996), turn the Council of Ministers into an upper house alone (Habermas 2001) 
and find new ways of engendering the transnational representation of citizens, 
either through pan-European referendums (Auer 2007) or the promotion of 
supranational citizen associations (Schmitter 2000). In every case, the intention 
is to reduce the veto power of the member states thereby interfering with their 
claims to sovereign status as embodied by unanimity in the Council of Ministers 
or the right to reject treaty change, including via referendum. The inevitable result 
of these proposals, therefore, is the reduction of the autonomy of the member 
states by curtailing their confederal capacity to reject EU treaty amendment or 
negotiate consensus compromises by wielding the veto threat. 
 
Other institutional reforms seek to enhance supranational representation for the 
sake of greater efficiency, which, it is thought, will in turn lead to greater output 
legitimacy. This is the case for the establishment of the new president of the 
European Council, the highest political body comprising heads of state or 
governments of the member states meeting four times a year, and the eventual 
abolition of the one state one commissioner rule contained in the Lisbon Treaty. 
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In fact, both these reforms would constitute a new departure in the sovereignty 
game as they clearly go against the principle of state equality that is fundamental 
in confederal representation. By abolishing the rotating European Council 
presidency and the automatic award of a Commissioner, the sovereignty claims 
of small countries – sometimes the only asset they have left (Werner and de 
Wilde 2001, 304) – will no longer prove so useful or satisfying.  
 
When viewed from a certain angle, of course, the notion of state equality appears 
dubious. The contrast, for instance, between the fallout from the French “no” to 
the EU Constitution which the EU political elite has still barely digested and 
previous referendum rejections that led immediately to new votes is striking. 
However, reform of the presidency and the college of commissioners means that 
the confederal principle of state equality founded on states’ sovereignty claims 
would be greatly attenuated. In particular, substantial and very visible changes to 
state equality, such as the loss of a commissioner, will greatly affect the element 
of majesty that underlies successful sovereignty claims (Onuf 1991). The 
importance of this aspect of sovereignty should not be underestimated, 
especially in so far as the majesty stemming from equal treatment sustains the 
state’s relationship with what has been called the domestic audience for 
sovereignty claims (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 290). Hence the majesty 
stemming from state equality is not simply a question of respect from other 
states; it is also a feature of self-respect. In a reconfigured EU, nation-state 
majesty would, in all likelihood, have to be maintained or reinvented – which 
explains why the TEC fudged this matter.  
 
All the above proposals for democratic EU reform thus represent an attempt to 
transform its hybrid nature of political representation by diluting the principle of 
confederalism that tries to uphold both member state equality and liberty. This 
suggests that the often-asserted claim that the equation between federalism and 
centralization so feared by the UK is “an ahistorical reading” (Dehousse 2005, 
116) is misleading. The attenuation of the confederal principle of representation 
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may not automatically equate to a more overweening centre, but it would 
produce a concentration of political representation around that centre. 
Furthermore, by breaking down confederalism’s anti-majoritarian bulwarks, such 
as vetoes and unanimous treaty revision, member states would find serious 
obstacles to sovereignty assertions, whether to limit supranationalism for all or to 
individually assert special claims.  
 
In other words, the instrumental uses to which sovereignty claims could be put 
would simply diminish once it became harder to use them in practice. Such 
proposals rest on blatantly blithe assumptions, namely that not only will 
institutional arrangements render sovereignty claims unproblematic but that 
member states will accept such reforms in the first place. Yet the troubling 
feature of these proposals is less the latter assumption than the former, which 
fails to recognize the dynamic use to which sovereignty claims have been put in 
the course of integration as shown in section two. By recognizing this feature of 
integration it is possible to draw an entirely different conclusion than the 
prescription that sovereignty claims are simply a bother that have to be 
overcome. Given that sovereignty claims arise most when the claimed status of 
sovereignty is challenged (Werner and de Wilde 2001), it seems likely that further 
successful integration – at least according to the official motto of “united in 
diversity” – would require a new way of instrumentalizing sovereignty. Here is not 
the place to put forward detailed proposals on this subject. But it is relatively easy 
to single out new ways of articulating sovereignty claims perhaps consisting of a 
revamped subsidiarity system based on criteria of diversity rather than 
effectiveness, a reconfigured inter-institutional relationship allowing the Council 
of Ministers greater scope for amending legislation proposed by the Commission 
and the ability to re-assess ECJ rulings (both tabled by the UK government at the 
Amsterdam IGC), or even a version of the American constitutional doctrine of 
nullification (Tipton 1969) operating via national parliaments or direct democracy. 
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The analysis, in section three, of the reciprocal relationship between democracy 
and the sovereignty game of integration revealed the ongoing problem of 
incorporating the autonomy and equality of states within a democratic, partly 
supranational polity. Nevertheless, some of the literature on the EU’s democratic 
deficit assumes – explicitly (Moravcsik 2006), or implicitly (Coultrap 1999; 
Follesdal and Hix 2005; Hix 2007) – the relative stability of the EU constitutional 
settlement. When this is the case, rather than requiring a democratization of the 
EU, the impact of the sovereignty game of integration on democracy is thought to 
demand above all a new understanding of democratic governance and how best 
it functions. Yet the question still remains as to what this means for sovereignty 
claims.   
 
Democratic Governance: Can Sovereignty Claims be Buried? 
 
Two strands of thought can be distinguished within the literature on democratic 
governance in the EU. The first tries to dispel fears about the hollowness of EU 
democracy; the second believes that within the existing system a dose of “limited 
democratic politics” (Hix 2007), based on the left/right dimension, needs to be 
injected to reconnect the polity with its citizens. Common to both is once again a 
sidelining of the problem of sovereignty claims within the delicate and, as seen 
above, highly contested system of EU competences and institutions. 
 
Essentially, the first school is that of pluralist democracy. According to this model, 
whatever the alien nature of the mixed system in comparison to parliamentary 
regimes, the EU remains democratically legitimate thanks to its highly 
institutionalized checks and balances (Coultrap 1999; Majone 2006). Non-
majoritarian institutions, it is insisted, are potentially just as legitimate as 
majoritarian ones. However, what matters in this case is institutional design and 
the nature of the objectives to be pursued (Majone 2005). Hence if the EU is to 
be faulted it is not for its democratic deficit but for unsound institutional design 
and inappropriate policy objectives (ibid.). Paradoxically, the solution mooted for 
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both these shortcomings is precisely a new constitutional settlement that would 
strengthen the confederal principle at the expense of the supranational, 
“community method” (ibid.). So it seems that after first dismissing the link 
between the sovereignty game of integration and the problem of democratic 
legitimacy, sovereignty claims reappear. Not for the sake of legitimacy but to 
make the system function better in terms of outputs. This only goes to show that 
there is good reason to believe that sovereignty claims, rather than having to be 
buried, can be used to tackle the problematic democratic consequences of the 
sovereignty game of integration.  
 
The second way of understanding democratic governance is to assume that the 
current integration status quo is too entrenched to be reformed substantively, yet 
still amenable to the injection of left/right politics over policy choice (Follesdal and 
Hix 2005; Hix 2006, 2007). This politicization approach believes that a minimal 
majoritarian element is possible thanks to the QMV-elected president of the 
Commission, which allows a more partisan college (Hix 2006, 19). What is 
surprising about this argument, as Bartolini (2006) points out, is the fact that the 
left/right cleavage is bound to raise fundamental, if not disquieting, questions 
about the constitution of the EU system itself, notably its competences and 
decision-making rules. Indeed, the cleavage over integration itself within member 
states has become more noticeable. Research on the recent referendums in the 
four countries that submitted the EU Constitution to a popular vote, which 
produced two ratifications and two rejections, emphasizes the essential “first 
order,” that is, European element, of the results (Glencross and Trechsel 2007). 
Thus it is not at all clear why a limited democratic politics of left/right policy 
choices in a polity that has little redistributive capacity should be a priority over 
the debate regarding the future shape of integration.  
 
Attempts to reconcile integration with democracy, whether from the supranational 
perspective or the governance approach, thus stumble precisely over the 
question of sovereignty claims. This is because neither treats member states’ 
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assertions of sovereignty as an integral part of how to respond to the 
intermeshed sovereignty and democracy games. Yet the uncanny feature of 
democratic legitimacy in the EU is the fact that this compound polity also rests on 
a compounded legitimacy: it “depends on both EU and national levels” (Schmidt 
2004, 982). Since sovereignty claims are aimed at both external and internal 
audiences they seem uniquely capable of finding if not a solution then at least a 
modus vivendi for democracy and sovereignty games played out at two levels. 
As presented in section one, the current EU system demonstrates the creative 
use to which sovereignty assertions have been used in the construction of this 
hybrid polity. It is therefore odd to discover that such an instrument does not play 





By examining the contested principles of representation structuring the EU polity 
this chapter tried to shed some new light on the strategic relationship between 
sovereignty, integration and democracy. European integration poses manifold 
challenges to sovereignty and democracy. The result is a certain “deficit 
anxiety,”12 prompting attempts to show that democracy can be reconciled with 
what is often called “post-sovereignty” but which is perhaps better captured by 
Walker’s notion of a “sovereignty surplus” (2007, 5). No such guarantees or 
reassurances were offered here. Rather, the chapter demonstrated how the 
problem of reconciling sovereignty claims with democracy has become 
marginalized when it comes to finding solutions to the adverse effects of 
integration on democracy in Europe.  
 
Current proposals to overcome or bury member states’ sovereignty were shown 
to suffer from serious shortcomings. As a result, the analysis suggests that 
member state assertions of sovereignty ought to be considered as a means of 
negotiating the relationship between integration, sovereignty and democracy. 
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However, the recent experience of the Lisbon Treaty points to a continued failure 
to take sovereignty claims seriously. Most egregiously, the treaty was pruned of 
the rhetoric of its constitutional forebearer so as to give member states a ready 
excuse not to ratify it by referendum – despite retaining the vast majority of the 
institutional and decision-making changes contained in the EU Constitution. 
Obviously, this state of affairs is the product of member state collusion. Still 
under the shock of the referendum rejections of the EU Constitution in France 
and the Netherlands, Europe’s political elite has opted to elide the sovereignty 
issue. Disingenuously, these elites portray the Lisbon Treaty as a tidying-up 
exercise without sovereignty implications, thereby rendering referendums 
redundant.  
 
In this way the whole gamut of sovereignty claims – as barrier to 
supranationalism, as a state’s right to a special status and as expression of 
popular sovereignty through referendums – has for the moment been buried. Yet 
the experience of integration is one of a welter of contestation and renegotiation 
over the rules of the game of integration politics, interspersed only briefly with 
moments of calm. With several important changes scheduled for future 
implementation, such as the eventual abolition of the one commissioner per 
country rule or the move towards a new system of QMV, and with the detail of 
others – notably the UK opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights – 
unspecified, there are many looming complication. Perhaps it will be necessary 
for this new political settlement to be called into question before a collective 
epiphany about the role of sovereignty claims in the EU system is possible. 
Whatever the timing, this awakening will probably consist of the realization that 
the continuation of integration in a way acceptable to states and their citizens 
requires the juxtaposition of contradictory principles of representation that results 
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 Jackson (1999, 433) goes further in claiming that sovereignty is “an institution which is 
periodically renovated to respond to new historical circumstances”.  
2
 MacCormick (1999), famously, has taken a more nuanced view by likening sovereignty to 
virginity, viz. something that is lost but not gained by another party.  
3
 The absence of a specific withdrawal clause did not prevent Greenland, which joined as part of 
the Kingdom of Denmark but obtained home rule in 1979, from seceding from the EEC in 1985 
with the consent of the European Council. Witte (2004a) argues that a right of withdrawal under 
the EEC treaty can be implied from state practice in the EEC treaty given that the UK called a 
referendum in 1975 on continued membership of the European Communities. 
4
 Such a conflict arose over the question of harmonizing criminal sanctions in the field of 
environmental protection. The Commission argued this should occur under the Community 
regime whilst the Council of Ministers sought to implement legislation as an EU framework 
decision. The ECJ ruled in favor of the Commission in Case C-176/03 Commission v Council. 
5
 For reasons of conceptual clarity I do not dwell on the German Constitutional Court”s notorious 
decision on the constitutional validity of the Maastricht Treaty. This seems to represent an 
assertion of sovereignty to limit supranationalism but articulated in the name of an individual 
state, thereby blurring the conceptual framework adopted in this section.  
6
 The UK subsequently signed up to the Social Protocol in 1997 following a change of 
government (Shaw 1998, 68).  
7
 Denmark also obtained a specific guarantee that EU citizenship would not jeopardize Danish 
sovereignty on deciding matters of citizenship. In addition, Denmark was also exempted from 
supranational cooperation on asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation.  
8
 Ireland, following a Supreme Court decision on the Single European Act, is the only member 
state constitutionally obliged to hold a referendum on EU treaty revision. 
9
 The European precedent for holding a national vote on enlargement was France”s 1972 vote on 
EEC expansion. 
10
 Schmitt probably overstates the importance of democratization as the post civil war era was 
notable for the construction of a national sense of political community (Greenfeld 1992). In fact, 
the relationship between democratization and nationalism is highly complex, as Yack (2001) has 
argued very powerfully that popular sovereignty as a modern phenomenon unintentionally 
fostered the assumption that political organization supposed a national community. 
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